The impact of stringent insider trading laws and institutional quality on the cost of capital by Kwabi, Frank O. et al.
1 
 
The impact of stringent insider trading laws and institutional quality on the cost of 
capital 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines the effects of interaction between stringent insider trading laws, 
institutional quality and equity portfolio allocation on the cost of capital. Using a dataset drawn 
from 44 countries over the period from 2001-2015, we find that stringent insider trading laws 
interact with institutional quality and foreign equity portfolio allocation to reduce the country-
level cost of capital. Further analysis from a quasi-natural experiment based on the 2008-2009 
global financial crisis suggests that the findings are robust to endogeneity. Our results imply 
that the enactment of stringent insider trading laws and their interplay with the quality of 
institutions are not only important to portfolio investment allocation decisions but reduce the 
country-level cost of capital. 
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1. Introduction 
Cross-border investments have accelerated and become a global phenomenon over the 
past three decades. Scholars and multilateral institutions attribute the rising trends of cross-
border investments to a number of factors, including the forces of globalisation and integration 
of financial markets, which have brought down barriers to foreign investment activities (Lau, 
Ng, and Zhang, 2010; UNCTAD, 2015). As a result, the cost of capital required to fund foreign 
investments has fallen (Kose, Eswar, Prasad, and Taylor, 2011). Commensurate with the rising 
trends of cross-border investments is the increasing amount of literature examining the 
determinants of cost of capital (see Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002; Johnstone, 2015). 
However, studies that directly examine the combined effects of stringent insider trading laws 
(SITL), institutional quality (INSTQ) and foreign equity portfolio allocation (Port_Alloc) on 
the cost of capital remain relatively unexplored.  
The paucity of studies on the effects of interaction between INSTQ and SITL appears 
surprising, given that several researchers have documented that institutions affect the cost of 
doing business and riskiness of the firm with implications for the cost at which capital funds 
are raised (see Hail and Leuz, 2006; Du, Boateng, and Newton, 2016). Similarly, SITL and the 
volume of portfolio investment allocation engender confidence in the market by improving 
stock price informativeness, reduce information asymmetry and monitoring costs, and enhance 
market efficiency (Fernandes and Ferreira, 2009). More importantly, cost of capital, which 
represents the required rate of return for investors, constitutes a crucial input for long-term 
investment decisions and drives investment allocation in foreign countries (Chen, Chen, and 
Wei, 2009). It may, therefore, be conjectured that stringent insider trading laws, quality of 
institutions and the volume of portfolio investment allocation may interact to lessen 
information asymmetry among investors, increase investors’ willingness to trade and thereby 
lead to greater liquidity (Hail and Leuz, 2006; Chen et al., 2009), with implications for cost of 
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capital. Yet as far as we are aware, no systematic investigation to date has been conducted on 
the joint effect of institutional quality, international equity portfolio allocation and stringent 
insider trading laws on the cost of capital. We fill this gap by investigating whether SITL 
interacts with INSTQ and Port_Alloc to reduce country-level cost of capital.  
The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of interactions between stringent 
insider trading laws, institutional quality, portfolio allocation and the cost of capital. Our main 
hypothesis is that stringent insider trading laws, quality of institutions in the country and equity 
portfolio allocation, interact to reduce the cost of capital. We test this hypothesis in an 
international setting covering 44 countries. We further check the robustness of the hypothesized 
relationship by using the 2008-2009 global financial crisis to perform quasi-natural experiment 
by employing the differences-in-difference (DiD) model. Our results show that the relationship 
between the SITL and cost of capital is moderated by the quality of host country institutions. 
Regarding the relationship between the Port_Alloc and institutional quality, we document that 
the combined effect of SITL and Port_Alloc reduce the cost of capital. Further results from the 
quasi-natural experiment utilising the 2008-2009 financial crisis suggests that our findings are 
robust to endogeneity. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the related 
literature and hypothesis development. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 reports the 
empirical analysis and the results, and section 5 concludes the paper and offers policy 
implications. 
 
2. Related literature review and hypothesis development 
2.1. Effects of stringent insider trading laws on the cost of capital 
Prior studies suggest that foreign investors are susceptible to expropriation when insider 
trading laws and institutions are weak (Fernandes and Ferreira, 2009). It is argued that such 
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weaknesses lead to an increase in agency cost and asymmetry information, and a reduction in 
investors’ participation in the stock market with implications for the cost of capital. The above 
argument is broadly consistent with the earlier work of La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (1997) and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006), which documented 
that institutions and regulation of securities are related to the equity market’s development. It 
is argued that well-functioning legal systems protect outside investors and help reduce non-
diversifiable risk, and consequently the cost of capital, through a number of mechanisms 
including reduction in information asymmetry and risk, greater willingness to trade and stock 
market liquidity (Chen et al., 2009; Hail and Leuz, 2006).  This argument is also in line with 
the findings of Botosan (1997) and Beny (2008) who reported that insider trading laws and the 
quality of institutions within a country reduce information asymmetry, lower risk, engender 
confidence among investors and enhance stock market participation and liquidity. Similarly, 
Uche, Adegbite, and Jones (2016) found that insider trading laws lessen the agency conflict, 
increase investors’ confidence in the market, and facilitate the institutional shareholders’ 
monitoring of management rather than seeking to profit from insider trading. Overall, it is 
argued that countries that have stringent insider trading laws attract more foreign investors as 
the laws reduce controlling shareholders’ incentives to divert corporate value through trading 
on price-sensitive, private information. La Porta López-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2002) 
and Hail and Leuz (2006) therefore found countries with stringent insider trading laws and 
extensive disclosure requirements enjoy higher firm value and lower cost of capital. 
It is pertinent to point out that while prior studies have documented the effects of either 
institutions or insider trading laws on the cost of equity, it is less clear whether insider trading 
laws interact with institutions and portfolio investment allocation to reduce the cost of capital. 
In this study, we attempt to shed light on the combined effects of stringent insider trading laws, 
institutions’ and equity portfolio investment allocation and cost of capital. 
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2.2. Hypotheses development 
2.2.1. Impact of institutional quality on the cost of capital 
Institutional quality can impact on the cost of capital through its influence on SITL. A 
country can have SITL on the books but the likelihood of enforcement will depend on the 
quality of the country’s institutional environment (Adegbite, 2015). Strong regulatory and legal 
institutions help the enforcement of SITL. Previous empirical studies show that it affects the 
cost of capital. For instance, Hail and Leuz (2006) found that legal institutions explain cross-
country variations in cost of capital. Levitt (1998) argues that strong institutions improve the 
quality of accounting standards and therefore reduce the cost of capital. Regulatory deterrent 
is a combined function of the substantive content of the law and the possibility that the law will 
be enforced (Zimring and Hawkins, 1973). Well-functioning institutions ensure that the rule of 
law prevails, increase transparency, and improve the efficiency and independence of judicial 
systems to enforce SITL. We therefore argue that INSTQ affects information risk through 
enforcement of SITL. This indicates that strong institutions are important to the liquidity of the 
stock market. While this claim is intuitively appealing, the theoretical work on the hypothesized 
relationship is surprisingly little. In particular, it is ambiguous as to what extent INSTQ is 
relevant to SITL in determining cost of capital.  
Countries that have strong legal institutions will experience less information 
asymmetry. Equity investors will experience lower monitoring costs, which will lead to 
investors demanding a lower risk premium and therefore reduce firms’ cost of capital. 
Eleswarapu and Venkataraman (2006) contend that the legal environment of a country affects 
information risk and stock market liquidity. Strong institutions that protect minority investors 
from expropriation by corporate insiders will reduce the cost of capital by means of increased 
risk sharing. The investor participation in the stock market will not only depend on the laws 
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banning insider trading but the joint effects on the confidence that there are strong institutions 
to enforce the laws (Eleswarapu and Venkataraman, 2006). For instance, the presence of an 
independent and efficient judicial system for public enforcement will reduce expropriation risk. 
Glaeser, Johnson, and Shleifer (2001) contend that the private right to enforce laws mainly 
depends on actions taken by the relevant regulatory authorities. When a country has strong 
institutions, the likelihood of enforcement will increase, with a positive effect on the 
information environment. 
We argue that, information asymmetry is more severe in countries with poor INSTQ, 
resulting in increased investors monitoring costs. When informed investors trade on private 
information and uninformed investors do not have access to private information, equilibrium 
prices are influenced by informed investors’ information demand. The rational expectations of 
equilibrium prices are derived from the equilibrium required return on equity, which is the cost 
of capital. SITL interacts with INSTQ to reduce the cost of capital through increased 
enforcement and stock prices becoming more informative. In the equilibrium, systematic risk 
will be lower as investors demand lower compensation for risk exposure. This is because 
investors will not be crowded out by corporate insiders and tend to engage in informed trading, 
which reduces risk premium. Strong institutions that enforce SITL will deter and reduce 
expropriation risk by insiders and this lowers the risk premium required by investors. Cost of 
capital should fall when countries enact SITL and complement them with strong institutions 
that can enforce the laws. Consequently, we set our first hypothesis as follows:  
 
H1: The interaction between stringent insider trading laws and institutional quality reduces cost 
of capital. 
 
2.2.2. Impact of foreign equity portfolio allocation on the cost of capital 
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We provide the channel through which foreign equity portfolio allocation connects with 
SITL to reduce the cost of capital. First, when a country enacts insider trading laws, it tends to 
attract foreign equity investors due to the fact that corporate insiders are not able to trade on 
price sensitive non-public information. Previous empirical studies document that foreign 
investors from well-governed countries demand better minority right protection and put 
pressure on national governments to enforce insider trading laws (see Boubakri, Cosset, and 
Guedhami, 2005; Kho, Stulz, and Warnock, 2009; Kang and Kim, 2010; Huang and Zhu, 2015; 
and Kwabi, Thapa, Paudyal, and Adegbite, 2017). We therefore conjecture that foreign 
investors improve the degree of information flow and alter the relevant source of systematic 
risk for equity returns as stock prices become more informative. Further, Hail and Leuz (2006) 
find that countries that have enforcement mechanisms experience a lower cost of capital. This 
is because firms are able to raise external capital and take advantage of growth opportunities 
in a country that has a well-functioning legal system that protects minority investors. 
Countries that attract foreign investors tend to have their stock markets integrated with 
the rest of the world. In an integrated stock market, the variance of the stock market is lower 
than a segmented stock market (Bekaert and Harvey, 2003). The interaction between SITL and 
Port_Alloc will increase risk sharing between domestic and foreign investors. Consequently, 
the country’s expected return will be determined by the covariance of its return with global 
market portfolio return (Adler and Dumas, 1983). This concept is consistent with the regulatory 
quality hypothesis which suggests that countries that have better stock market rules and 
disclosures experience a lower cost of capital. This is because investors tend to demand lower 
expected returns as a result of increased transparency and lower information asymmetry. Easley 
and O’Hara (2004) developed a theoretical framework where a rational expectations 
equilibrium model between both private and public information affects asset values. 
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 Motivated by existing theoretical approaches (see Lewis, 1999 and Lau et al. 2010), 
we assume that local investors include both domestic and foreign equity in their portfolio. 
However, insider trading impedes the inflow of foreign equity investment. Therefore, in the 
absence of SITL, the domestic stock market becomes segmented which adversely affects the 
cost of capital. To illustrate the above point, let there be 𝐿 small countries, with country 𝑙 having 
𝑁𝑙equity assets and 𝑟𝑙 as its dollar-denominated return index return for asset 𝑖. We contend that 
there exists a representative mean-variance domestic investor 𝑑 in a country and that investor 
𝑑 holds a portfolio 𝑌𝑑 with a percentage 𝑊𝑖
𝑑 in asset 𝑖. Investor 𝑑 maximizes the following 
utility function. 
With 𝐸(𝑅) = (𝐸(𝑟1) … (𝑅(𝑟𝑁) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 Ʃ = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑅), we give the first-order condition as  
where γ represents the comparative risk-aversion parameter and, for brevity, all investors are 
assumed to have the same amount of comparative risk aversion. 𝑊𝑑 represents the vector of 
the proportions of asset holdings. The expected return of a domestic asset 𝑖 in investor 𝑑′𝑠 
country 𝑙 is given by 
where 𝑁𝑙 represents the number of securities in country 𝑙. If prior to the enactment of SITL, 
only domestic investors hold asset 𝑖, by aggregating over all these investors and taking the 
wealth-weighted average, the equilibrium risk premium is given in Equation 4. 
 
𝑈 = 𝑈(𝐸(𝑅), Ʃ), 
 
(1)  
 
𝐸(𝑅) = 𝛾Ʃ𝑊𝑑 
 
(2)  
 𝐸(𝑟𝑖) = 𝛾 ∑ 𝑊𝑗
𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑟𝑖, 𝑟𝑗)
𝑁𝑙
𝑗=1
 (3)  
 𝐸(𝑟𝑙) = 𝛾
𝑤𝑙 − 𝑤𝑙
∗
1 − 𝑤𝑙
∗ (𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑟𝑙) − 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑟𝑙, 𝑟𝑤)) + 𝛾𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑟𝑙, 𝑟𝑤) (4)  
9 
 
By multiplying both sides of Equation (4) by the market capitalization weight of asset 
𝑖 held by all domestic investors and aggregating over all assets they hold in country 𝑙, we obtain 
country 𝑙′𝑠 risk premium.  
𝑤𝑙
∗ is the country 𝑙′𝑠 market share in the world market portfolio, 𝑟𝑤 is the world market index 
return, 𝑟𝑙 denotes the return of country 𝑙, 𝛾 is the relative risk-aversion parameter.  
The first term on the right-side of Equation (5) reflects the risk premium associated 
with the covariance of asset 𝑖 with the domestic market return prior to a country enacting SITL. 
The second term is the risk element related to the covariance of asset 𝑖 with the world market 
portfolio return when a country enacts SITL. 
Equation (5) indicates the expected return of a country’s equity index associated with 
increased risk sharing between domestic and foreign equity investors, and domestic investors 
diversifying internationally following enactment of SITL. This will make the domestic 
country’s stock market integrated with the rest of the world. Therefore, the expected return of 
domestic equity will be proportional to the covariance of domestic equity return with the return 
on the world market portfolio, which is lower (see Bekaert and Harvey, 1995; de Jong and de 
Roon, 2005). This suggests that SITL influences the level of investment in the domestic stock 
market and expected return. Consequently, we therefore set our second hypothesis as follows. 
 
H2:  Stringent insider trading laws interact with foreign equity portfolio allocation to reduce 
the cost of capital.  
 
3. Data and methodology 
 
 𝐸(𝑟𝑙) = 𝛾
𝑤𝑙 − 𝑤𝑙
∗
1 − 𝑤𝑙
∗ (𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑟𝑙) − 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑟𝑙, 𝑟𝑤)) + 𝛾𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑟𝑙, 𝑟𝑤) (5)  
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This section describes the source of data and the three measures of cost of capital 
employed in our regression analysis, followed by SITL, INSTQ and Port_Alloc and the control 
variables that could have cross-sectional and temporal variations on the cost of capital.  
  
3.1. Cost of capital measures 
We employ three measures of cost capital that are commonly used in the finance 
literature (see Lau et al., 2010; and Damodaran, 2012). The measures are: (a) historical realized 
market risk premium (HRRm), (b) default spread-based country risk premium (CERP), and (c) 
dividend yield (DY). We use these three costs of capital measures to ensure that the SITL, 
INSTQ and Port_Alloc effects are not influenced by a particular cost of capital proxy.  
 
3.1.1. Historical realized market risk premium 
Following the empirical literature (see Lau et al., 2010), our study employs the 
historical realized return of the market (HRRm) which captures the historical average of excess 
country market return over government treasury bills. For each year, we employ the monthly 
US dollar country stock market indices sourced from Morgan Stanley Capital International 
(MSCI) to calculate the annual market return. We further employ the annual average of the 
monthly return on US treasury bills to proxy for risk-free rates for all countries in our sample 
to reflect the returns being dominated in US dollars. 
The main advantage of using the historical realized market return to capture the 
expected risk premium is that the long-term average premium reverses to the mean. The HRRm 
measure is suitable as a cost of capital proxy in developed markets that have long historical 
data. However, it can be problematic in several emerging countries that have relatively shorter 
data on historical return and may produce on the average, a lower degree of standard errors. 
We address this concern by employing Damodaran’s (2012) country equity risk premium 
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which captures sovereign default spread and adjusts for equity risk relative to bond markets’ 
expected return. 
 
3.1.2. Country equity risk premium 
To substantiate the impact of SITL, INSTQ, and Port_Alloc on the historical realized 
market return, we also test their effects on the country equity risk premium (CERP) as an 
alternative cost of capital measure. The country risk premium measure is based on Damodaran 
(2012). This is from the view of demanding incremental country equity risk premiums for 
equity investment allocation in a particular market, compared to a developed stock market as a 
based country. 
Damodaran (2012) constructed CERP by using the United States as a based mature 
country and S&P as the representative stock market. The incremental risk premium is 
constructed relative to the based country (United States), and reflects a further country risk 
premium. It is calculated by incorporating the default spread over the United States, using 
sovereign bonds ratings in local currency obtained from Moody. The resulting risk premium is 
subsequently divided by the ratio of the country’s equity market volatility to the bonds’ market 
volatility. For example, in calculating the equity risk premium for Mexico, Damodaran (2012) 
first calculates the default risk premium of 10-year government bonds denominated in pesos 
over the 10-year US treasury bills. The ensuing premium is then adjusted for further equity 
market risk divided by the ratio of the standard deviations of Mexico’s equity to bond market. 
The returns on the 10-year Mexico treasury bills and those of the Mexico equity market are 
used to calculate the standard deviations of the bond market. 
 
3.1.3. Dividend yield 
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Bekaert and Harvey (2005) argue that the historical realized returns have some 
limitations for emerging markets where returns are relatively more volatile than those of their 
developed market counterparts. Consistent with prior work in the finance literature, we use 
dividend yield (𝐷𝑌) as an additional measure for cost of capital (see Bekaert and Harvey, 2000; 
and Lau et al., 2010). We source 𝐷𝑌 data for all countries from Thompson Reuters and the 
World Federation of Exchanges.   
 
3.2. Independent variables 
In our analysis, our main independent variables of interest are SITL, INSTQ and 
Port_Alloc. We discuss them as follows.  
 
3.2.1. Stringent insider trading laws 
SITL captures the restrictiveness of a country’s stock market regulations in deterring 
corporate insiders from trading on non-public price sensitive information. SITL measure is an 
aggregate of four elements: (1) Laws inhibiting corporate insiders from trading on price-
sensitive non-public information, (2) the country’s laws prohibiting tippees from trading with 
price-sensitive non-public information provided by corporate insiders, (3) the extent of 
financial penalty suffered as a result of breaking insider trading laws, and (4) whether insider 
trading is regarded as a criminal offence. Following Beny (2008), we calculate SITL as a total 
of four elements. First, SITL takes a value of one if a corporate insider is liable under the 
country’s insider trading laws for providing price-sensitive non-public information to the 
tippee and otherwise zero. Second, we award a value equal to one if under the country’s insider 
trading laws, the tippee is forbidden from trading on price-sensitive private information 
provided by the corporate insiders and otherwise zero. Third, SITL takes a value of one if the 
likely financial penalty for flouting insider trading laws is greater than the proceeds from the 
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illicit trading and otherwise zero. Finally, we allocate a value equal to one if trading on insider 
information is considered as a criminal activity under the country’s insider trading laws and 
otherwise zero (see Beny, 2008 for the data source).  
 
3.2.2. Institutional quality 
Several countries tend to have SITL on the books but hardly enforce them to deter 
corporate insiders from trading on price-sensitive non-public information. Countries that have 
better institutional quality are more likely to enforce insider trading laws. Zimring and Hawkins 
(1973) contend that a regulatory deterrent is a combined function of the substantive content of 
the law and the possibility that the law will be enforced. We use data from World Governance 
Indicators (WGI) to construct the institutional quality (INSTQ) variable. The institutional 
quality measure is a composite index of judicial efficiency, regulatory quality, rule of law, and 
control of corruption. It is constructed on a scale of 0 (lower score) to 100 (higher score) 
reflecting the institutional quality environment of a country. In equation (3), we interact 
institutional quality with stringent insider trading laws.   
 
3.2.3. Foreign equity portfolio allocation 
We use the annual bilateral Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) dataset for the period from 2001-2015 to construct a 
foreign portfolio allocation for each country. The CPIS provide data on bilateral equity 
holdings for 76 stock markets. IMF requires all the participating countries to provide a 
breakdown of equity portfolio investment. We model foreign equity portfolio allocation as our 
independent variable following Cooper and Kaplanis (1986). The foreign equity portfolio 
allocation of country 𝑖 into country 𝑗 is defined as:  
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where 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the weight of foreign equity portfolio allocation from country 𝑖 into country 𝑗 for 
the year 𝑡, and 𝐹𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 is foreign investors’ actual portfolio allocation in USD millions. 
 
3.3. Control variables 
In order to isolate the effects of SITL, INSTQ and Port_Alloc on the cost of capital, we 
draw from existing literature regarding variables shown to have effects on the cost of capital. 
As in Lau et al. (2010), we control for the effects of market beta ( Mbeta), market capitalization 
(MCap), and book-to-market (BM) on the cost of capital. Fama and French (1993) show that 
these variables explain cross-sectional variation in equity returns.  
The capital asset pricing model shows a positive relationship between market beta and 
expected returns. We calculate Mbeta as the MSCI country index return over the MSCI All 
Country World index return using monthly data for the previous five years. Subsequently, we 
scale the subsequent covariance by the variance of the MSCI World index return. 
Next, we employ the natural log of market capitalization (MCap) denominated in USD 
millions to capture the effects of size and information on the cost of capital. Existing literature 
shows that larger stock markets experience more transparency and better disclosure which 
reduces information asymmetry and cost of capital (see Hail and Leuz, 2006). We sourced 
market capitalization data from World Development Indicators (WDI). 
Following Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001), we employ book-to-market ratio 
(BM) to capture differences in countries growth opportunities. BM reflects cost of monitoring, 
growth opportunities and accounting conservatism, which affects a country’s perceived risk. 
We calculate BM as the natural log country-level ratio of book-to-market. Following existing 
studies, we compute the sum of a country-level book value by adding the constituents of each 
𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝐹𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡
∑ 𝐹𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡
44
𝑗=1
)  (6)  
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country and dividing the total by the country’s total market capitalization. We obtained data 
from WorldScope. 
Empirical studies by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) show that previous year’s stock 
market performance (Retn_1) affects the expected return. We use Retn_1 to capture the 
momentum effect on the cost of capital. As in Lau et al. (2010), we compute Retn_1 as the 
average MSCI monthly index return over the previous year. Next, we use log stock market 
integration (LSMI) which we construct as the natural log of a country’s annual exports plus 
imports divided by GDP to control for the effects of stock market openness and integration on 
the cost of capital. An integrated stock market will experience lower cost of capital because the 
expected return is measured by the covariance of the country’s return with world market return 
divided by the variance of world market return, which is lower than a segmented stock market 
return, and is determined by the variance of the segmented market return. 
We use real gross domestic product growth (RGDPG) to capture the growth 
opportunities’ effect on international risk sharing. Foreign investors tend to allocate more 
equity investment to countries that experience high economic growth and this has a negative 
effect on the cost of capital due to increased risk sharing between domestic and foreign 
investors. We also use exchange rate volatility (Exch) to capture the correlation between equity 
return and foreign exchange return. We calculate Exch by using a three-year moving average 
of the covariance between a country’s market index return and the monthly depreciation of the 
local currency relative to the US dollar. We obtained exchange rates data from Thompson 
Reuters. 
Existing literature shows that equity risk premiums have a positive association with 
inflation (see Brandt and Wang, 2003). We employ one-year lagged inflation (Inf) to ensure 
that cost of capital is not driven by changes to macroeconomic fundamentals as a result of 
inflation. We sourced inflation data from WDI. 
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Studies show that countries’ specific risk affects the expected returns of a country. Erb, 
Harvey, and Viscanta (1996) demonstrate that country risk ratings affect expected equity 
returns. We use two country-level risk measures; economic risk (EconRisk), and financial risk 
(FinRisk) to control for their effects on the cost of capital. We obtained data for these variables 
from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). We compute the country risk measures 
using annual averages based on the monthly ratings.1 
Lastly, we control for the degree of portfolio diversification by using equity home bias 
(EHBIAS). The literature on the international capital asset pricing model suggests that when 
domestic investors overinvest in their local stock market, the domestic stock market tends to 
be segmented and it reduces risk sharing, which tends to have a positive impact on the cost of 
capital (see Lau et al., 2010). We compute EHBIAS as the natural log value of domestic 
investors’ equity allocation in their home country’s stock market capitalization relative to the 
country’s global market capitalization weight. We sourced data from the CPIS of IMF. 
 
4.  Empirical Analysis 
 
4.1. Summary statistics 
Table 1 presents the univariate analysis that compares the mean of developed markets 
(panel A) and emerging markets (panel B) of cost of capital, SITL, INSTQ, Port_Alloc and 
control variables. In line with theoretical expectations, the means suggest that developed 
countries have lower cost of capital relative to emerging markets. Correspondingly, developed 
countries have stringent insider trading laws. 
The mean cost of capital for developed markets is 𝐻𝑅𝑅𝑚 = 10.7%, 𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑃 = 6% and 
𝐷𝑌 = 2.6% relative to emerging markets of 𝐻𝑅𝑅𝑚 = 22.9%, 𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑃 = 11.6% and 𝐷𝑌 = 3.8%. 
                                                          
1 See ICRG, 2016 for additional details on the method. 
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Average SITL, INSTQ and 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐 in developed markets are 2.9, 90.95 and 0.0427 
respectively, compared to 2.7, 56.41 and 0.0022 in emerging markets. Table 1 offers strong 
indication that those countries with SITL and INSTQ attract more foreign equity portfolio 
allocation in order to experience a lower cost of capital. 
 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
 
4.2. Correlation matrix 
Table 2 presents the correlation matrix among the variables employed in our empirical 
analysis. SITL, INSTQ and 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐 have a negative and significant correlation with all the 
cost of capital proxies. The results suggest that SITL and INSTQ reduce information asymmetry 
and monitoring cost. As a result, investors will demand a lower risk premium, which will 
reduce the cost of capital. The correlation among SITL, INSTQ, 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐 and cost of capital 
proxies are relatively low, suggesting multicollinearity is not an issue in this study. 
 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
 
4.3 Multivariate regression analysis 
 
4.3.1. Cost of capital and stringent insider trading laws 
Table 3 presents the regression results regarding the impact of stringent insider trading 
laws on the cost of capital. We run the regression using first difference ∆𝐶𝑜𝐶𝑗𝑡 to mitigate the 
probable concern of any non-stationarity. The specification below is estimated. 
In Equation (7), ∆𝐶𝑜𝐶𝑗𝑡 represents the first difference of one of the three measures of 
∆𝐶𝑜𝐶𝑗𝑡 (i.e. HRRm, CERP, and DY), one at a time, of country j at time t.  SITL is regressed one 
 ∆𝐶𝑜𝐶𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1. ∆𝑆𝐼𝑇𝐿𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2. ∆𝐶𝑡𝑙𝑠𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3. 𝑇𝐹𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽4. 𝐶𝐹𝐸𝑗 + 𝜖𝑗𝑡 (7)  
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at a time.  𝐶𝑡𝑙𝑠𝑗𝑡 is a vector of the control variables of country 𝑗 at time 𝑡. TFE and CFE are 
time (year) and country fixed effects respectively.2  
Models (1-3) of Table 3 report the coefficients for the three cost of capital proxies. As 
evident throughout the specifications, the coefficients of SITL have the expected negative sign 
and are statistically significant at the 1% level for all the proxies of cost of capital (SITL β =  -
0.315; 𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 =  -3.21); (β = -0.204; 𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 =  -2.56); (β = -0.294; 𝑡 −
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 =  -3.17) for HRRm, CERP and DY respectively. The coefficients of SITL are 
negative and statistically significant, which is in contrast to Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) 
who used the enactment dates of insider trading laws. The results indicate that stringent insider 
trading laws reduce the cost of capital, suggesting that countries that have SITL experience a 
lower cost of capital. The results may be explained by the reduced risk premium demanded by 
investors as a result of low information asymmetry and lower monitoring costs streaming from 
the benefits of stringent insider trading laws. The negative effect of SITL on the cost of capital 
is in line with Choi, Li and Hongjun (2016) who found SITL reduced the cost of capital as a 
result of improvement in the information environment. 
 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
 
4.3.2. The effect of institutional quality on the cost of capital 
In this section, we examine the combined effects of SITL and INSTQ on the cost of 
capital as specified in Equation (8).  
 
                                                          
2 For the sake of brevity we do not report the estimates of year and country fixed effects. 
 
𝐶𝑜𝐶𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1. 𝑆𝐼𝑇𝐿𝑗𝑡+ 𝛽2. 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑄𝑗𝑡+ 𝛽3. 𝑆𝐼𝑇𝐿𝑗𝑡  × 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑄𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4. 𝐶𝑡𝑙𝑠𝑗𝑡 
       + 𝛽5. 𝑇𝐹𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽6. 𝐶𝐹𝐸𝑗 + 𝜖𝑗𝑡                                                                                        (8) 
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Table 4 presents the effect of interaction between SITL and INSTQ on the cost of capital. 
We find the coefficients for the interaction of SITL×INSTQ in models 1-3 (β = -0.511; 
t − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 = -3.02); (β = -0.525; 𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 =  -2.68); and (β = -0.646; 𝑡 −
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 =  -2.87). The coefficients are negative and statistically significant across all the 
cost of capital proxies. The marginal effects are also negative and significant in all the three 
models, confirming the results. The results indicate that SITL interact with INSTQ to lower the 
cost of capital.  Hypothesis 1 is therefore supported. The findings may be explained by the fact 
that stringent insider trading laws and the quality of institutions in a country engender 
confidence among investors, reduce information asymmetry, risk associated with foreign 
investments and monitoring cost, and consequently the cost of capital.  
 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
 
4.3.3. The effects of foreign equity portfolio allocation on the cost of capital 
To test the effects of interaction between SITL and foreign equity portfolio allocation 
on the cost of capital, we specify the following model: 
 
Models 1 to 3 of Table 5 present the results of the effects of interaction between SITL 
and foreign equity portfolio allocation on the cost of capital. The coefficients are negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level in all three models. The coefficients of the interactive 
variable in all the three models (β = -0.533; 𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 = -3.50), (β = -0.516; 𝑡 −
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 = -3.02); (β = -0.319 (𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 = -2.73) for HRRm, CERP, and DY 
respectively. The results support hypothesis 2 and indicate that foreign investors allocate more 
investment to countries with stringent insider trading laws. The findings support the view that 
stringent insider trading laws encourage greater willingness among foreign investors to trade 
 
𝐶𝑜𝐶𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1. 𝑆𝐼𝑇𝐿𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2. 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3. 𝑆𝐼𝑇𝐿𝑗𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑗𝑡 
       + 𝛽4. 𝐶𝑡𝑙𝑠𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽5. 𝑇𝐹𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽6. 𝐶𝐹𝐸𝑗 + 𝜖𝑗𝑡                                                                   (9) 
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and increase stock market liquidity and consequently help reduce the cost of capital. The 
findings appear in line with the findings of Botosan (1997) and Beny (2008) who reported that 
stringent insider trading laws and the quality of institutions within a country reduce information 
asymmetry, lower risk, engender confidence among investors and enhance stock market 
participation and liquidity.  
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
Regarding the control variables, the results presented in Tables 3-6 have the expected 
signs and are statistically significant. RGDPG, MCap, and LSMI are negative and significant 
at the 1% level, and consistent with the findings of Lau et al. (2010). Mbeta and EHBIAS have 
a positive and statistically significant association with the cost of capital. The results render 
some support to the findings reported in existing studies (see El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok, & 
Mishra, 2011; and Lau et al., 2010). Retn_1, Exch, EconRisk, FinRisk, and BM are positively 
related to the cost of capital. The coefficients for Inf are negative but statistically insignificant.  
 
4.4. Robustness test 
In this section, we check the robustness of our main analysis. In particular, we employ 
DiD to account for the concern of endogeneity. We also examine the impact of SITL and INSTQ 
on the cost of capital. 
 
4.4.1. Evidence from 2008 global financial crisis 
We use the 2008 global financial crisis to perform a quasi-natural experiment of 
“shocks” to the demand of SITL and better stock market regulations. Performing this analysis 
allows us to take into consideration the effects of time-invariant country-level factors while 
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addressing the influence of SITL and INSTQ via interaction terms. As in Lian and Renneboog 
(2017), we specify the DiD approach which we use to estimate the test as follows: 
where 𝐴𝑐, 𝐵𝑡 are country and year fixed effects respectively, 𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡 are the country-level control 
variables. 𝐼𝑙𝑡 is the interaction between SITL and the year dummy (2008) so that the estimated 
impact of SITL in year t is captured by the OLS estimate ŷ and 𝜖𝑖𝑐𝑡 is an error term. To account 
for serial and cross-sectional correlations, we clustered standard errors across countries and 
over time. 
In Table 6, we report the quasi-natural experiment regarding the 2008 global financial 
crisis which, on average, moved firms and countries out of equilibrium as the financial crisis 
triggered the demand for stringent stock market regulations. The use of the 2008 global 
financial crisis allows us to make comparisons across countries. 
The DiD estimator is the coefficients on SITL×Post-2008 and INSTQ×Post-2008. In 
models 1-3 of Table 6, the coefficients on SITL are positive and statistically significant at the 
1% level. Similarly, in models 4-6 of Table 6, we run a separate regression using INSTQ. The 
coefficients on INSTQ in models 4-6 of Table 6 are positive and statistically significant at the 
1% level. Overall, the results show that the 2008 global financial crisis improved stock market 
regulations and institutional quality, and subsequently lowered the cost of capital. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
5. Contributions and Conclusions 
In this study, we examined the effects of interaction between stringent insider trading 
laws, institutional quality and equity portfolio allocation on the cost of capital based on a large 
dataset of 44 countries over a period from 2001-2015. We find that countries that have SITL 
experience a lower cost of capital. Regarding the combined effects of stringent insider trading 
 𝐶𝑜𝐶𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝐴𝑐 + 𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝛾𝐼𝑙𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑐𝑡 (10) 
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laws, institutional quality and equity portfolio allocation, we find that SITL interacts with 
institutional quality (INSTQ) and foreign equity portfolio allocation (Port_Alloc) to reduce the 
country-level cost of capital. Further analysis from a quasi-natural experiment based on the 
2008-2009 global financial crisis suggests our results are robust to endogeneity.  
The findings of this study have important implications for investors and policy makers. 
First, our results imply that institutional quality and stringent insider trading laws play a 
significant role in influencing a country’s cost of capital, suggesting policy makers should pay 
attention to these factors if they want to reduce the country-level cost of capital and attract 
foreign investments. More specifically, policy makers at a national level should not only aim 
to enact SITL, but should complement them with strong institutions to pursue enforcement to 
reduce risk and attract foreign investments. Second, our findings also suggest that stringent 
insider trading laws and institutional quality enhance equity market participation among 
foreign investors, improve liquidity and risk-sharing opportunities and reduce the cost of 
capital. We therefore suggest that policy makers of emerging countries with small stock 
markets should review and strengthen their insider trading laws and establish good and 
independent institutions to curtail the risks often associated with these markets and improve 
participation from foreign investors.  
The study makes two primary contributions to the literature. First, this study extends 
prior literature in finance on the role of institutions, stringent insider trading laws and portfolio 
allocation on the cost of capital. Specifically, our paper complements the studies of Hail and 
Leuz (2006) and Chen et al. (2009) and shows that stringent insider trading laws, institutions, 
and portfolio allocation interact to reduce the cost of capital.  Thus our results suggest that 
while the enactment of stringent insider trading laws is important, its interplay with the quality 
of institutions within the country further affect the perceived riskiness of doing business in a 
country, facilitate better enforcement and significantly lower the cost of capital. Similarly, the 
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enactment of stringent insider trading laws moderate portfolio investment allocation decisions, 
increase liquidity, market efficiency and information flow among investors, and consequently 
reduce the cost of capital.  
Second, the results re-affirm that the cost of capital, which represents a return required 
by an investor, is important for long-term investment decisions. Thus, our results indicate that 
those countries with stringent insider trading laws and quality institutions attract foreign equity 
investors, and reduce the perceived risk of expropriation of investments by corporate insider 
traders. The confidence generated through SITL and INSTQ reduces the country risk premium 
and the cost of capital. Our findings continue to hold after controlling for firm-level and other 
country-level factors and further employing the 2008-2009 global financial crisis to perform a 
quasi-natural experiment using the DiD model.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1 
Definitions of Variables 
Variable Abbreviation Description 
Historical realized market return HRRm The historical realized market return measured as the historical average of excess country equity market return over 
risk-free rate. 
Country equity risk premium CERP The country equity risk premium based on adding the sovereign default risk premium (scaled by the relative 
volatility of equity to bond market) to the equity risk premium of a base country (The United States). 
Dividend yield DY The dividend yield measured as the total amount of stock dividend of a country as a percentage of the market 
capitalization of the country. 
Stringent insider trading laws SITL An index that ranges between 1 (least stringent) and 4 (most stringent) and is the aggregate of four elements: Laws 
forbidding insiders from trading on price-sensitive private information, the country’s regulations forbidding tippees 
from using the price-sensitive private information provided by corporate insiders, financial penalty suffered for 
violating insider trading laws, and if insider trading is considered as a criminal offence. 
Market beta Mbeta The covariance of MSCI countries’ world index return over the past five years divided by MSCI world index return 
variance. 
Return Retn_1 The average MSCI monthly index return over the past year. 
Exchange rate Exch The three year moving average covariance of the monthly stock market index return with the monthly change of 
the domestic currency with respect to the dollar. 
Inflation Inf The following year's percentage change in the consumer price index. 
Log stock market integration LSMI The ratio of a country's annual exports plus imports divided by GDP. 
Real gross domestic product growth RGDPG The real growth rate in the domestic product. 
Economic risk EconRisk The economic risk rating index of a country from the International Country Risk Guide. 
Financial risk FinRisk The financial risk rating index of a country from the International Country Risk Guide. 
Market capitalisation  MCap The market capitalization of a country. 
Book to market BM The log country-level ratio of book-to-market. 
Equity home bias EHBIAS The investor protection measure obtained from World Bank Governance Indicator of good governance. 
Institutional quality 
 
Portfolio allocation 
INSTQ 
 
Port_Alloc 
The institutional quality of a country measured as the aggregate of government effectiveness, control of corruption, 
regulatory quality, and rule of law. 
The log value of country wise bilateral foreign portfolio allocation from country 𝑖 in country 𝑗 at time 𝑡 (𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡) 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics of dependent and independent variables 
 
Note: The variables in columns 2-4 are the three cost of capital measures. 𝐻𝑅𝑅𝑚 is the historical realized market return measured as the historical average of excess country equity market return 
over risk-free rate; 𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑃 is the country equity risk premium based on adding the sovereign default risk premium (scaled by the relative volatility of equity to bond market) to the equity risk 
premium of a base country (The United States); 𝐷𝑌 is the dividend yield measured as the total amount of stock dividend of a country as a percentage of the market capitalization of the country; 
SITL is the stringent insider trading laws index that ranges between 1 (least stringent) and 4 (most stringent); 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐 is the portfolio allocation, which is the log value of country wise bilateral 
foreign portfolio allocation from country 𝑖 in country 𝑗 at time 𝑡;  INSTQ is the institutional quality of a country; MCap is the country market capitalization; Mbeta is the covariance of MSCI 
countries’ world index return over the past five years divided by MSCI world index return variance; BM is the log country-level ratio of book-to-market; Retn_1   is the average MSCI monthly 
index return over the past year; Exch is the three year moving average covariance of the monthly stock market index return with the monthly change of the domestic currency with respect to the 
dollar; Inf is the following year's percentage change in the consumer price index; LSMI is a measure of market integration measured as the ratio of a country's annual exports plus imports divided 
by GDP; RGDPG is the real growth rate in the domestic product; EconRisk represents the economic risk rating index of a country; FinRisk is the financial risk of a country; EHBIAS is equity 
home bias and is calculated as the log value of the share of domestic investors in their own country's stock market capitalization (l) relative to the country's world market capitalization weight. 
 
Panel A: Developed markets 
Country 
HRRm 
(%) 
CERP 
(%) 
DY 
(% of 
price) 
SITL 
(0-4) 
Port_Alloc 
 
INSTQ 
(0-100) 
MCap 
(in USD 
millions) 
Mbeta 
(%) 
BM 
(Ratio)  
Retn_1 
(%)  
Exch 
(% ) 
Inf  
(%) 
LSMI 
(% of 
GDP) 
RGDPG  
(%) 
EconRisk  
(0-50) 
FinRisk  
(0-50) 
EHBIAS 
 
Australia 12.4 7.5 3.3 3 0.0116 95.03 76438 0.86 0.49 5.6 0.8 2.8 41.26 2.96 29.13 36.09 3.46 
Austria 11.1 8.3 2.0 2 0.0124 95.35 55971 0.83 0.58 3.8 0.2 2.1 96.34 1.41 33.65 38.43 4.18 
Belgium 9.6 7.2 2.3 3 0.0249 89.37 177876 0.94 0.5 1.9 0.3 2.2 149.03 1.3 42.97 27.78 3.32 
Canada 10.2 4.2 2.0 4 0.0251 94.91 1062678 0.97 0.29 5.4 1.1 1.9 66.91 20.4 41.84 29.51 2.81 
Denmark 13.4 4.6 1.2 3 0.0124 98.80 135542 0.89 0.71 1.9 1.4 1.9 93.73 0.6 43.53 41.92 4.22 
Finland 17.3 6.8 2.6 3 0.0082 98.91 145079 1.58 0.57 7.2 0.9 1.7 76.14 1.24 45.22 37.21 4.15 
France 11.5 6.3 2.6 4 0.0869 88.84 1433149 1.15 0.35 1.9 0.9 1.6 54.82 1.1 34.92 30.69 2.62 
Germany 15.1 5.4 2.3 3 0.0831 92.73 1029901 1.28 0.36 2.7 4.6 1.6 74.98 1.03 36.07 26.22 2.19 
Greece 17.4 9.5 5.3 2 0.0034 74.17 60206 1.58 0.86 7.3 4.2 2.6 55.58 -0.01 34.77 32.76 4.72 
Hong Kong 9.6 7.7 3.4 3 0.0268 92.35 440529 1.13 1.12 2.5 0.7 1.6 387.19 3.81 43.84 41.38 2.87 
Ireland 5.6 4.2 2.4 3 0.0568 93.23 56975 0.86 0.45 7.8 0.9 2.2 162.49 2.35 41.85 35.59 2.84 
Israel 13.1 5.7 2.8 4 0.0017 80.83 80736 1.12 0.98 6.7 0.9 2.1 72.24 3.36 36.16 31.27 4.68 
Italy 11.3 5.2 3.2 3 0.0416 72.22 475029 0.92 0.48 2.5 0.2 2.1 51.79 -0.07 35.05 31.76 2.84 
Japan 5.7 7.4 1.7 2 0.1048 85.34 2840190 0.66 0.95 1.4 -1.4 0.1 28.24 0.77 36.28 43.47 1.73 
29 
 
Netherlands 6.8 4.3 3.6 3 0.0518 96.80 349413 1.2 0.47 2.2 0.7 2 133.14 1.01 41.93 29.08 2.31 
New Zealand 5.8 4.7 3.4 3 0.0014 96.77 17449 0.95 0.55 11.3 1.2 2.4 59.7 2.49 27.89 26.52 5.77 
Norway 13.7 5.6 2.5 1 0.0183 95.26 157211 1.19 1.24 5.1 1.2 1.9 69.76 1.6 44.6 44.74 3.87 
Portugal 12.2 7.1 3.3 3 0.0056 84.31 52160 0.86 0.36 4.6 0.6 2.2 68.39 0.07 34.63 34.63 5.28 
Spain 14.3 6.5 2.7 3 0.0195 86.53 459606 0.93 0.27 6.4 0.9 2.5 55.76 1.42 38.29 36.77 3.09 
Sweden 10.7 5.3 2.4 3 0.0137 96.85 337099 1.31 0.31 5.2 0.6 1.3 84.68 1.96 44.64 28.42 3.75 
Switzerland 6.6 4.4 1.5 3 0.0385 96.84 870989 0.65 0.49 4.5 1.2 0.6 108.32 1.82 44.93 45.24 3.11 
United Kingdom 6.4 4.8 2.3 3 0.1121 94.69 2422146 0.87 0.39 4.5 0.5 2.3 56.96 1.72 34.08 24.27 2.03 
United States 5.2 4.7 1.5 4 0.2259 91.74 12494889 0.92 0.48 3.3 0.4 2.3 26.65 1.8 27.8 30.56 0.65 
                  
Mean 10.7 6.0 2.6 2.9 0.0427 90.95 1097011 1.03 0.58 4.6 1.0 1.9 90.18 2.35 38.0 34.10 3.33 
 
Panel B: Emerging markets 
Country 
HRRm 
(%) 
CERP 
(%) 
DY 
% of 
price) 
SITL 
(0-4) 
Port_Alloc 
 
INSTQ 
(0-100) 
MCap 
(in USD 
millions) 
Mbeta 
(%) 
BM  
(Ratio) 
Retn_1  
(%) 
Exch 
(%) 
Inf  
(%) 
LSMI 
(% of 
GDP) 
RGDPG  
(%) 
EconRisk  
(0-50) 
FinRisk  
(0-40) 
EHBIAS 
 
Argentina 23.5 16.3 3.5 3 0.0008 39.55 16599 1.35 0.65 8.2 3.1 10.5 33.52 3.82 32.43 31.15 6.62 
Brazil 33.7 13.6 4.6 2 0.0006 53.57 557521 2.12 1.36 16.3 1.8 6.5 25.98 3.24 34.98 32.63 5.34 
Bulgaria 29.3 11.3 3.3 2 0.0003 58.05 50205 1.33 1.44 11.2 3.8 4.8 109.77 3.32 31.08 32.3 9.59 
Chile 20.1 8.5 4.6 3 0.0025 89.27 103694 1.05 0.98 12.6 1.5 3.7 68.95 4.10 40.14 25.74 5.33 
China 13.8 9.5 3.6 3 0.0083 44.41 852177 1.27 1.08 11.8 1.7 2.4 50.82 9.82 37.37 46.5 3.15 
Czech Rep 30.3 7.1 4.4 3 0.0009 76.18 32291 0.92 1.37 8.5 2.2 2.3 124.68 2.48 36.91 31.03 6.44 
Egypt 29.2 7.3 5.4 3 0.0002 42.21 2577 1.08 1.35 11.4 1.9 8.6 51.51 4.06 34.5 33.46 7.27 
Hungary 19.8 7.5 3.5 3 0.0031 78.49 20269 1.27 0.63 8.6 0.9 4.8 146.06 1.87 34.87 35.64 6.98 
India 21.5 12.7 3.3 2 0.0006 49.76 513996 1.15 0.9 10.2 1.82 7.1 43.74 7.25 33.53 37.38 4.76 
Indonesia 26.4 15.3 3.8 2 0.0003 30.92 122671 1.29 1.06 7.4 1.9 7.7 54.66 5.37 36.83 24.54 6.95 
Korea 14.2 9.4 2.1 4 0.0034 74.47 578838 1.57 0.31 4.7 1.6 2.9 84.77 4.04 41.64 34.19 4.56 
Malaysia 19.8 10.3 4.3 2 0.0009 69.31 197732 0.79 0.66 7.4 1.7 2.3 181.73 4.86 35.78 36.95 6.21 
Mexico 17.2 11.2 3.0 1 0.0089 53.49 215204 1.18 1.42 5.3 1.6 4.4 57.6 2.13 38.38 38.97 5.35 
Peru 26.3 12.7 4.4 4 0.0002 45.43 30396 1.23 1.12 5.4 2.7 2.6 46.71 5.48 39.06 31.58 7.63 
Philippines 23.4 13.6 3.8 2 0.0003 47.30 5487 1.01 1.05 9.7 1.6 4.4 82.24 5.11 29.84 35.77 6.26 
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Poland 25.7 9.4 3.7 3 0.0005 69.75 81434 0.87 0.8 5.8 0.8 2.7 76.85 5.58 36.48 36.19 5.97 
Romania 23.3 13.3 3.7 3 0.0006 53.44 20606 0.78 0.65 9.2 1.7 9.8 77.72 3.74 31.71 35.21 7.64 
Russia 14.3 14.8 3.5 3 0.0068 29.88 449528 1.71 0.64 5.1 3.5 11.3 54.39 4.21 37.73 43.92 4.9 
South Africa 19.4 11.4 4.3 2 0.0009 65.17 281864 1.12 1.08 11.4 2.1 5.9 59.13 3.14 35.07 25.91 4.78 
Thailand 26.8 12.8 4.2 3 0.0005 57.81 139412 1.44 0.86 8.1 2.5 2.7 138.21 3.85 34.2 33.74 5.83 
Turkey 24.6 15.5 2.8 4 0.0006 56.11 118926 2.28 0.53 12.6 2.2 15.7 51.69 4.14 32.59 32.02 5.44 
                  
Mean 22.9 11.6 3.8 2.7 0.0022 56.41 209116 1.28 0.95 9.1 2.0 5.8 77.17 4.36 35.48 34.04 6.05 
 
Overall: 
Mean 
 16.5 8.7 3.2 2.8 0.0233 74.46 673243 1.15 0.75 6.7 1.49 3.79 83.97 3.31 36.80 34.07 4.62 
Median 
 14.3 7.5 3.3 3 0.0062 79.66 151145 1.12 0.65 6.1 1.3 2.4 68.67 2.73 36.12 33.60 4.70 
Std Dev 
 7.7 3.5 1.0 0.74 0.426 21.16 1896035 0.34 0.35 3.5 1.12 3.18 59.12 3.27 4.64 5.69 1.85 
Minimum 
 5.2 4.2 1.2 1 0.0002 29.88 2577 0.65 0.27 1.4 -1.4 0.1 25.98 -0.07 27.8 24.27 0.65 
Maximum 
 33.7 16.3 5.4 4 0.2259 98.91 12494889 2.28 1.44 16.3 4.6 15.7 387.19 20.4 45.22 46.5 9.59 
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Table 2 
Pearson’s pairwise correlation coefficients between the dependent and independent variables 
 
Note: The variables labelled 1-3 are the three cost of capital measures. 𝐻𝑅𝑅𝑚 is the historical realized market return measured as the historical average of excess country equity market return over risk-free rate; 𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑃 
is the country equity risk premium based on adding the sovereign default risk premium (scaled by the relative volatility of equity to bond market) to the equity risk premium of a base country (The United States); 𝐷𝑌 is 
the dividend yield measured as the total amount of stock dividend of a country as a percentage of the market capitalization of the country; SITL is the stringent insider trading laws index that ranges between 1 (least 
stringent) and 4 (most stringent); 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐 is the portfolio allocation, which is the log value of country wise bilateral foreign portfolio allocation from country 𝑖 in country 𝑗 at time 𝑡; MCap is the country market 
capitalization; INSTQ is the institutional quality of a country; Mbeta is the covariance of MSCI countries’ world index return over the past five years divided by MSCI world index return variance; BM is the log country-
level ratio of book-to-market; Retn_1   is the average MSCI monthly index return over the past year; Exch is the three year moving average covariance of the monthly stock market index return with the monthly change 
of the domestic currency with respect to the dollar; Inf is the following year's percentage change in the consumer price index; LSMI is a measure of market integration measured as the ratio of a country's annual exports 
plus imports divided by GDP; RGDPG is the real growth rate in the domestic product; EconRisk represents the economic risk rating index of a country; FinRisk is the financial risk of a country; EHBIAS is equity home 
bias and is calculated as the log value of the share of domestic investors in their own country's stock market capitalization (l) relative to the country's world market capitalization weight. For brevity and space, statistical 
significance of at least the 5% level is reported in bold.  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
HRRm (1) 1 
                
CERP (2) 0.56 1 
               
DY (3) 0.17 0.15 1 
 
   
           
SITL (4) -0.15 -0.14 -0.19 1 
             
Port_Alloc (5) -0.23 -0.11 -0.17 0.15 1  
           
INSTQ (6) -0.14 -0.19 -0.08 0.32 0.07 1 
           
Mbeta (7) 0.26 0.2 0.14 -0.07 -0.03 -0.04 1 
          
Retn_1 (8) 0.13 0.09 0.19 -0.06 0.05 0.21 0.19 1 
         
Exch (9) 0.08 0.12 0.11 -0.02 0.06 -0.26 0.05 -0.43 1 
        
Inf (10) -0.1 -0.15 -0.09 -0.12 -0.21 -0.03 0.05 0.16 0.11 1 
       
LSMI (11) -0.16 -0.24 -0.27 -0.06 0.11 0.09 -0.14 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 1 
      
RGDPG (12) -0.20 -0.23 -0.32 -0.05 0.02 0.03 0.09 -0.15 0.29 0.10 -0.05 1 
     
EconRisk (13) 0.11 0.22 0.05 0.04 -0.03 -0.04 0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.13 0.28 -0.06 1 
    
FinRisk (14) 0.09 0.07 0.21 -0.11 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 -0.07 0.06 -0.03 -0.04 0.09 -0.01 1 
   
MCap (15) -0.39 -0.19 -0.24 0.06 0.01 0.06 -0.04 0.02 0.04 -0.01 -0.19 -0.02 0.07 -0.05 1 
  
BM (16) 0.18 0.21 0.07 -0.45 -0.09 -0.01 0.05 0.3 -0.12 0.03 -0.04 0.07 -0.05 0.12 0.05 1 
 
EHBIAS (17) 0.18 0.44 0.14 -0.22 0.02 0.08 0.06 0.22 0.07 0.27 0.17 0.16 -0.2 0.02 -0.22 0.29 1 
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Table 3 
Cost of capital and stringent insider trading laws 
 
This table reports estimates of three specifications of Equation (7). In each specification the dependent variable is 
one of the three measures of cost of capital (i.e. HRRm, CERP, and DY) as defined in the notes to Table 1. The 
explanatory variable of key interest is SITL, also defined in the notes to Table 1. All the control variables are 
defined in the notes to Table 1. All variables are used as first difference. The t-statistics, reported in parentheses, 
are based on double clustered standard errors (clustering done at the country and year levels). For tractable 
interpretation, all the coefficients are reported as elasticity and the statistical significance is reported against 10% 
(*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance levels respectively.  
 
 Model (1) 
HRRm 
Model (2) 
CERP 
Model (3) 
DY 
∆SITL -0.315*** -0.404*** -0.594*** 
 (-3.21) (-2.56) (-3.17) 
∆Mbeta 0.692*** 0.963*** 0.683*** 
 (4.62) (3.66) (3.78) 
∆Retn_1 0.427 0.445 0.490*** 
 (1.10) (1.31) (4.70) 
∆Exch 0.354* 0.128** 0.364** 
 (1.77) (2.09) (2.35) 
∆Inf -0.349* -0.202** -0.695* 
 (-1.86) (-2.37) (-1.68) 
∆LSMI -0.686** -0.788*** -0.654*** 
 (-2.03) (-2.86) (-3.05) 
∆RGDPG -0.148*** -0.164*** -0.389*** 
 (-3.15) (-3.09) (-3.99) 
∆EconRisk 0.495* 0.213** 0.539 
 (1.81) (2.48) (0.68) 
∆FinRisk 0.417* 0.411 0.319 
 (1.88) (1.02) (1.34) 
∆MCap -0.719*** -0.731*** -0.132*** 
 (-4.05) (-2.79) (-3.45) 
∆BM 0.177** 0.308 0.274 
 (2.47) (1.26) (1.53) 
∆EHBIAS 0.175*** 0.689*** 0.229*** 
 (3.59) (3.70) (2.88) 
Constant 0.805** 0.111*** 0.630*** 
 (2.11) (7.91) (4.82) 
Number of Observations 645 645 645 
Adj. R-square 0.45 0.44 0.36 
Country effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
 ∆𝐶𝑜𝐶𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1. ∆𝑆𝐼𝑇𝐿𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2. ∆𝐶𝑡𝑙𝑠𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3. 𝑇𝐹𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽4. 𝐶𝐹𝐸𝑗 + 𝜖𝑗𝑡 (7) 
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Table 4 
The effects of institutional quality 
 
 
This table reports estimates of three specifications of Equation (8). In each specification the dependent variable is 
one of the three measures of cost of capital (i.e. HRRm, CERP, and DY) as defined in the notes to Table 1. The 
explanatory variable of key interest is SITL, also defined in the notes to Table 1. INSTQ is institutional quality; 
SITL×INSTQ is the stringent insider trading laws interaction with institutional quality. All the control variables 
are defined in the notes to Table 1. The t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on double clustered standard 
errors (clustering done at the country and year levels). For tractable interpretation, all the coefficients are reported 
as elasticity and the statistical significance is reported against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance levels 
respectively.  
 
 Model (1) 
HRRm 
Model (2) 
CERP 
Model (3) 
DY 
SITL -0.246** -0.299** -0.483*** 
 (-2.27) (-2.08) (-3.02) 
INSTQ -0.211** -0.306** -0.462** 
 (-2.34) (-2.14) (-2.30) 
SITL×INSTQ -0.511*** -0.525*** -0.646*** 
 (-3.02) (-2.68) (-2.87) 
Mbeta 0.702*** 0.981*** 0.676*** 
 (3.77) (2.52) (2.73) 
Retn_1 0.489 0.276 0.463** 
 (1.26) (1.19) (2.32) 
Exch 0.553* 0.124*** 0.419** 
 (1.80) (3.89) (2.41) 
Inf -0.325 -0.197*** -0.679 
 (-1.31) (-2.85) (-1.57) 
LSMI -0.766*** -0.862*** -0.120*** 
 (-2.78) (-2.90) (-3.12) 
RGDPG -0.154** -0.165** -0.694*** 
 (-2.24) (-2.17) (-3.00) 
EconRisk 0.494 0.541*** 0.341 
 (1.57) (2.78) (0.68) 
FinRisk 0.379 0.495 0.322* 
 (1.44) (0.51) (1.83) 
MCap -0.645*** -0.315*** -0.134** 
 (-4.33) (-2.76) (-2.47) 
BM 0.180*** 0.309 0.270 
 (2.82) (1.38) (1.50) 
EHBIAS 0.177*** 0.693*** 0.228*** 
 
Marginal Effects 
(3.94) 
-0.274 
(4.60) 
-0.315 
(3.07) 
-0.246 
Constant 0.609*** 0.111*** 0.508*** 
 (2.82) (4.77) (3.18) 
Number of Observations 645 645 645 
Adj. R-square 0.45 0.44 0.32 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
 
𝐶𝑜𝐶𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1. 𝑆𝐼𝑇𝐿𝑗𝑡+ 𝛽2. 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑄𝑗𝑡+ 𝛽3. 𝑆𝐼𝑇𝐿𝑗𝑡  × 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑄𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4. 𝐶𝑡𝑙𝑠𝑗𝑡 
       + 𝛽5. 𝑇𝐹𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽6. 𝐶𝐹𝐸𝑗 + 𝜖𝑗𝑡                                                                            (8) 
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Table 5 
Interaction between SITL and foreign equity portfolio allocation on the cost of capital 
 
 
This table reports estimates of three specifications of Equation (9). In each specification the dependent variable is 
one of the three measures of cost of capital (i.e. HRRm, CERP, and DY) as defined in the notes to Table 1. The 
explanatory variables of key interest are SITL, and Port_Alloc also defined in the notes to Table 1. 
SITL×Port_Alloc is the stringent insider trading laws interaction with foreign equity portfolio allocation. All the 
control variables are defined in the notes to Table 1. The t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on double 
clustered standard errors (clustering done at the country and year levels). For tractable interpretation, all the 
coefficients are reported as elasticity and the statistical significance is reported against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% 
(***) significance levels respectively.  
 Model (1) 
HRRm 
Model (2) 
CERP 
Model (3) 
DY 
SITL -0.201*** -0.252*** -0.290*** 
 (-4.29) (-2.84) (-2.67) 
Port_Alloc -0.214*** -0.235*** -0.152*** 
 (-3.08) (-3.22) (-2.76) 
SITL x Port_Alloc -0.533*** -0.516*** -0.319*** 
 (-3.50) (-3.02) (-2.73) 
Mbeta 0.592*** 0.964*** 0.441** 
 (7.29) (3.84) (2.33) 
Retn_1 0.455 0.740* 0.642*** 
 (1.15) (1.72) (6.56) 
Exch 0.167** 0.357*** 0.374** 
 (2.15) (3.98) (2.48) 
Inf -0.149*** -0.315*** -0.403 
 (-3.22) (-3.60) (-1.21) 
LSMI -0.878* -0.610*** -0.472*** 
 (-1.70) (-4.92) (-3.31) 
RGDPG -0.366** -0.274*** -0.483*** 
 (-2.03) (-7.55) (-3.37) 
EconRisk 0.240* 0.147*** 0.332 
 (1.72) (2.71) (0.96) 
FinRisk 0.440** 0.320 0.468* 
 
MCap 
(2.26) 
-0.876*** 
(-10.75) 
(1.32) 
-0.101*** 
(-3.72) 
(1.93) 
-0.237*** 
(-4.29) 
BM 0.296*** 0.355 0.291 
 (4.09) (1.58) (1.13) 
EHBIAS 0.399*** 0.512*** 0.216*** 
 
Marginal Effects 
(4.82) 
-0.254 
(7.99) 
-0.412 
(4.48) 
-0.363 
Constant 0.486** 0.220*** 0.336*** 
 (2.15) (8.84) (2.98) 
Number of Observations 645 645 645 
Adj. R-square 49 47 48 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
𝐶𝑜𝐶𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1. 𝑆𝐼𝑇𝐿𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2. 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3. 𝑆𝐼𝑇𝐿𝑗𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑗𝑡 
       + 𝛽4. 𝐶𝑡𝑙𝑠𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽5. 𝑇𝐹𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽6. 𝐶𝐹𝐸𝑗 + 𝜖𝑗𝑡                                                      (9) 
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Table 6 
Differences-in-difference: Evidence from 2008 global financial crisis 
 
This table reports estimates of six specifications of Equation (10). In each specification the dependent variable is one of the three measures of cost of capital (i.e. HRRm, CERP, 
and DY) as defined in the notes to Table 1. The explanatory variables of key interest are SITL× Post-2008, which is the interaction of stringent insider trading laws and the post 
2008 financial crisis; and INSTQ × Post-2008, which is the interaction of institutional quality and post 2008 financial crisis. All the control variables are defined in the notes to 
Table 1. All variables are used as first difference. The t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on double clustered standard errors (clustering done at the country and year 
levels). For tractable interpretation, all the coefficients are reported as elasticity and the statistical significance is reported against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance 
levels respectively.  
 
 Model (1) 
HRRm 
Model (2) 
CERP 
Model (3) 
DY 
Model (4) 
HRRm 
Model (5) 
CERP 
Model (6) 
DY 
SITL× Post-2008 -0.318*** -0.402** -0.507***    
 (-2.77) (-2.04) (-2.96)    
INSTQ × Post-2008    -0.366*** -0.397*** -0.581*** 
    (-3.21) (-3.64) (-3.29) 
Mbeta 0.300*** 0.216*** 0.726*** 0.223*** 0.175*** 0.648** 
 (3.67) (4.07) (2.88) (3.44) (2.91) (2.30) 
Retn_1 0.306* 0.215 0.374*** 0.211* 0.133 0.359*** 
 (1.97) (1. 21) (2.76) (1.82) (1.05) (2.62) 
Exch 0.747 0.170*** 0.698*** 0.682 0.175*** 0.773*** 
 (1.10) (3.84) (2.78) (1.15) (3.87) (2.85) 
Inf -0.484 -0.495* -0.320 -0.503 -0.467* -0.381 
 (-1.06) (-1.91) (-0.93) (-1.07) (-1.93) (-1.24) 
LSMI -0.857*** -0.498*** -0.203*** -0.640** -0.585** -0.194*** 
 (-3.75) (-2.60) (-3.19) (-2.32) (-2.26) (-2.97) 
RGDPG -0.126* -0.593** -0.152*** -0.169** -0.435* -0.163*** 
 (-1.91) (-2.34) (-3.29) (-2.14) (-1.93) (-3.44) 
EconRisk 0.720** 0.687** 0.534 0.753** 0.590** 0.506 
 (2.01) (2.05) (0.48) (2.37) (2.10) (0.48) 
FinRisk 0.429 0.163 0.276* 0.373 0.148 0.282** 
 (1.43) (0.96) (1.97) (1.24) (0.73) (2.11) 
MCap -0.503*** -0.345*** -0.120*** -0.468*** -0.321*** -0.123*** 
 (-3.44) (-2.86) (-3.19) (-3.18) (-2.83) (-3.28) 
 𝐶𝑜𝐶𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝐴𝑐 +  𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝛾𝐼𝑙𝑡 +  𝜖𝑖𝑐𝑡 (10) 
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BM 0.164** 0.580 0.562** 0.198** 0.432 0.394* 
 (2.02) (1.26) (2.25) (2.45) (1.24) (1.71) 
EHBIAS 0.235*** 0.517*** 0.386*** 0.271*** 0.458*** 0.356*** 
 (4.13) (3.89) (2.94) (4.60) (3.22) (2.93) 
Constant -0.709** 0.188*** 0.534*** -0.784*** 0.176*** 0.546*** 
 (-2.48) (4.21) (3.24) (-2.61) (3.79) (4.52) 
Number of Observations 645 645 645 645 645 645 
Adj. R-square 0.36 0.33 0.28 0.38 0.34 0.29 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
